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Abstract
On 20 April 2018 the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies and Assonime jointly organised a workshop at the 
European University Institute’s (EUI) campus in Florence. 
The title of the event was ‘Antitrust enforcement in Europe 
after Intel and Cartes Bancaires, a kind of trouble to enjoy’. The 
conference discussed the impact of the rulings of the EU Court 
of Justice (CJ) in Intel1 and Cartes Bancaires2 on competition 
law enforcement at the national and the EU level. The event 
was opened with a keynote speech that was delivered by Svend 
Albaek, Deputy Chief Economist of the DG Competition of the 
European Commission. The workshop included two panels, 
which dealt, respectively, with fidelity rebates after Intel, and 
vertical agreements after Cartes Bancaires. A final roundtable 
discussion concluded the event and debated the assessment 
of legal and economic ‘context’ in EU competition law 
enforcement. The event gathered representatives from National 
Competition Authorities (NCAs), the European Commission, 
academia, industry, as well as law and economic consulting 
firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively debate. This Policy 
Brief summarises the main points that were raised during the 
discussion and seeks to stimulate further debate.
1. Case C-413/14, Intel v. European Commission (2017) 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:632. 
2. Case C-67/13, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. European Commis-
sion (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204.
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I. Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Rebates 
After Intel
On 6th September 2017, the CJ delivered its long-
awaited ruling in Intel. The case originated from 
an annulment proceeding against the 2009 EU 
Commission Decision that sanctioned Intel under 
Art. 102 TFEU.3 The firm was fined €1 billion 
by the EU Commission for having abused its 
dominant position in the x86 central processing unit 
(CPU) market. In particular, Intel granted fidelity 
rebates, and made direct payments, to computer 
manufacturers, who installed CPUs in their hardware 
that were manufactured by Intel. According to the 
EU Commission, such practices were aimed at 
excluding AMD (i.e., Intel’s main competitor) from 
the CPU market. In the first instance ruling, the 
EU General Court upheld the EU Commission’s 
Decision.4 By contrast, on appeal, the CJ annulled 
the Decision and referred the case back to the GC, 
where the case is currently pending.
The ruling is relevant since the CJ openly endorsed a 
more effect-based approach to Art. 102 assessment, 
and the Court decided on the case as a Grand Chamber. 
On the one hand, the CJ stressed that the objective of 
Art. 102 TFEU is neither to prevent an undertaking 
from acquiring a dominant position ‘on its own 
merit’, nor to safeguard ‘less efficient competitors’.5 
On the other hand, the Court confirmed the well-
established Hoffmann La Roche case law, whereby 
a fidelity rebate is presumed to be in breach of Art. 
102.6 However, the CJ also emphasised that such 
case law should be ‘further clarified’.7 In particular, 
if during the investigations the dominant firm puts 
forward ‘supportive evidence’ to justify its conduct, 
the EU Commission is required to analyse the ‘effect’ 
3. European Commission Decision, COMP/C-3/37.990, 
Intel. Published in Brussels on 13.5.2009. OJ C-227/13, 
22.9.2009.
4. Case T-286/09, Intel Corporation v. European Commission 
(2014) ECLI:EU:T:2014:547.
5.  Supra, Intel, para. 133. 
6. Supra, Intel, para. 137.
7. Supra, Intel, para. 138.
of the conduct on the market. In particular, the EU 
Commission is required to analyse:8
• the extent of the firm’s dominant position in the 
market;
• the share of the relevant market that is covered 
by the contested practice;
• the conditions for granting the rebate;
• the duration and amount of the rebate;
• the possible existence of a strategy by the 
defendant that aims to exclude competitors 
"that are at least as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking".
In Intel, the Court, while confirming the objective 
nature of the concept of abuse under Art. 102 TFEU, 
for the first time, adds that the dominant firm can 
rebut a presumption of abuse if it provides ‘supportive 
evidence’ to show the legality of its conduct. In such 
a case, the EU Commission will have to analyse the 
effect of the conduct on the competition dynamics 
in the market. In particular, the EU Commission 
will have to assess the conduct ‘capacity’ to foreclose 
from the market a competitor that is ‘as efficient as’ 
the dominant firm.9 
The use of the ‘As Efficient Competitor’ (AEC) test 
for the assessment of rebates was considered by 
the EU Commission in its 2009 Guidance Paper in 
order to refine the scope of its investigations under 
Art. 102.10 In Intel, the Court annulled the previous 
GC ruling because, in its 2009 Decision, the EU 
Commission had relied on the AEC test, while, on 
appeal, the GC did not take into consideration Intel’s 
arguments which challenged the application of this 
test by the EU Commission.11
The Intel case has left a number of open questions, 
which were the subject of lively debate during the 
workshop:
8. Supra, Intel, para. 139.
9. Supra, Intel, para. 140.
10. Communication from the Commission, Guidance on 
its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings. OJ C-45/7, 24.2.2009.
11.  Supra, Intel, para. 147.
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• Is the clarification provided in Intel a matter 
of substance or of procedure? According to 
the participants, Intel has consequences for 
EU competition law enforcement, both from 
a substantive and from a procedural point of 
view. The case de facto overrules well-established 
CJ case law in Hoffmann La Roche, since it 
recognizes that exclusivity rebates should not be 
condemned per se but should be analysed within 
their economic and legal context. On the other 
hand, Intel also has important consequences from 
a procedural point of view, since it introduces a 
rebuttable presumption of abuse. Consequently, 
during the investigations, the dominant firm will 
always try to put forward several arguments in 
order to justify its conduct. 
• What is the meaning of ‘capacity to foreclose’? 
During the workshop, participants extensively 
debated whether, in Intel, the CJ introduced a 
minimum threshold to assess the capacity of the 
anti-competitive conduct to foreclose the market. 
There was disagreement among the panelists on 
whether, and to what extent, the EU Commission 
will have to consider all of the factors mentioned 
in para. 139 of the Intel ruling so as to assess the 
capacity to foreclose. In particular, it remains 
unclear whether the EU Commission will always 
have to prove the existence of a foreclosure 
strategy by the dominant firm. Furthermore, 
there was also disagreement among the 
participants on the ‘substantive evidence’ that the 
dominant firm will have to put forward in order 
to rebut the abuse presumption: some panelists 
argued that, after Intel, the EU Commission 
will always have to analyse the economic and 
legal context in accordance with the criteria 
mentioned in para. 139, while others stressed 
that the EU Commission could, in theory, reject 
the supportive evidence put forward by the 
dominant firm as being insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of abuse, and thus would need to 
carry out an object-based analysis.
• What is the value of the AEC test after Intel? 
Participants debated on whether, and to what 
extent, the AEC test becomes compulsory in 
every Art. 102 case after Intel. In Post Danmark 
II the CJ states that in particular cases Art. 
102 should protect also “not yet as efficient 
competitors” and thus the AEC test would be 
irrelevant. These situations, however should be 
strictly circumscribed in order to preserve the 
right of the dominant company to compete on 
prices. For conditional rebates, the case-law 
suggests that the AEC test is not necessary but 
represents a possibility. On the other hand, in 
Intel the CJ argues that if the test has been carried 
out by the undertaking, it should be considered 
by the review court. 
A final aspect that was debated during the workshop 
concerned the impact of the Intel ruling on national 
competition law enforcement. In particular, the 
impact of Intel on competition law enforcement in 
Italy and the UK was discussed during the event. The 
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 
(Italian NCA) has traditionally followed an effect-
based analysis in cases of abuses investigated under 
Art. 102. In Unilever12 and Poste Italiane,13 the Italian 
NCA has recently followed the wording of Intel. 
Both cases concerned fidelity rebates granted by 
the dominant firm in order to exclude competitors; 
both cases were decided upon by the Italian NCA 
after the CJ ruling in the Intel case. In particular, in 
Poste Italiane, the Italian NCA carried out the AEC 
test, concluding that a competitor as efficient as the 
dominant firm could not match the offer provided 
by Poste Italiane to its customers. Similarly, in 
Unilever, the Italian NCA carried out the AEC test, 
and concluded that the exclusionary agreements 
and fidelity rebates were part of a complex strategy 
carried out by Unilever to exclude small competitors 
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The application of a more effect-based approach to 
Art. 102 is also visible in the closure decision that 
was adopted by the UK Competition and Market 
Authority (CMA) in August 2017, in the Unilever 
case.14 The CMA decided to stop the investigations 
concerning an alleged scheme of fidelity rebates 
granted by Unilever to its distributors of impulse 
ice-cream. Unlike the Italian case, the scheme 
was implemented only during the winter months 
(i.e., February and March); a period in which the 
consumption of ice-cream is rather low in the UK. 
According to the British NCA, the rebates were 
aimed at preserving a minimum level of ice-cream 
distribution during the winter period, but they did 
not have any impact on Unilever’s market share. 
Consequently, the rebate scheme did not have an 
anti-competitive effect in the market.
II. Vertical Agreements After Cartes 
Bancaires
In the second session of the workshop, the impact 
of the Cartes Bancaires (hereinafter ‘CB’) judgment 
on the application of Art. 101 TFEU was discussed. 
The case originated from an infringement decision, 
adopted by the European Commission in 2007, 
against the largest association of credit institutions 
operating in France for a new compensation fee that 
banks, mostly issuing new debit cards (i.e., issuing 
banks), had to pay to banks, who mostly provided 
a cash withdrawal services (i.e., acquiring banks). 
According to CB, the new compensation scheme was 
needed to ensure a fair balance among the financial 
institutions operating in the French banking market. 
By contrast, according to the EU Commission, the 
main purpose of the practice was to keep the price 
of payment cards artificially high, to the detriment 
of new entrants, as well as consumers. The decision 
was appealed before the GC, which upheld the 
Commission’s position, and, in turn, before the CJ. 
The CJ quashed the GC’s decision and referred the 
case back to it for judgment.
14.  https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4a-
c6e7a5-87c1-470c-9ee5-707667969c80 (23.4.2018).
As stated by Advocate General Wahl, with this 
landmark judgment the CJ has had the opportunity 
to ‘refine its much debated case-law on the concept of 
restriction by object’.15 Following a well-settled line of 
reasoning that was developed in Allianz Hungária,16 
the Court held that, leaving aside the cases which 
are very likely to produce negative effects, such as 
the horizontal price-fixing cartels, the analysis of the 
effects of the conduct is necessary for the application 
of the prohibition laid down in Art. 101(1) TFEU for 
that type of coordination, which does not reveal a 
‘sufficient’ degree of harm to competition.
The determination of the boundaries of the 
qualification as a (prima facie) ‘by object’ restriction 
has traditionally been crucial to the competition law 
debate as a result of the impact that it has on the 
burden of proof in Art. 101 cases. Although the scope 
of the analysis to be carried out according to the CJ’s 
test that was proposed in CB remains disputable, due 
to the confusion it may create with the conceptual 
category of ‘effects’,17 the judgment takes place 
against the background of a wide acknowledgment 
of the fact that ‘the anticompetitive object of an 
agreement may not be established solely using an 
abstract formula’.18 At the same time, it was noted 
that it rejects the lower standards that were adopted 
in both Pierre Fabre19 and T-Mobile,20 by conveying a 
15. Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, delivered on 27 
March, 2014, para 3.
16. Case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt. and Others v 
Gazdasági Versenyhivatal (2013), ECLI:EU:C:2013:160.
17. Keti Zukakishvili, Luxury (by) object and the effects of si-
lence of the Court of Justice in Coty, College of Europe, 
Department of Legal Studies Case Notes, 2018.
18. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered on 3 March 
2011, in Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre, ECLI:EU:C:2011:113, 
para 26.
19. Case C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v 
Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence and Ministre de 
l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi (2011), ECLI:EU-
:C:2011:649.
20. Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, 
Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad 
van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit 
(2009), ECLI:EU:C:2009:343.
5 ■ Antitrust Enforcement in Europe after Intel and Cartes Bancaires - A Kind of Trouble to Enjoy
narrower conceptual interpretation of the ‘by object’ 
category.
Bearing in mind that, so far, similar ideas have been 
supported only by some opinions from Advocate 
Generals, participants agreed that it is the first time 
that the Court has held such a rigorous position. 
The debate thus focused on the determination of 
the existence of a 'sufficient' degree of harm to 
competition, which, according to the CJ’s line of 
reasoning, would require analysis of both the content 
and the objectives of the provisions of the agreement, 
in addition to the economic or legal context in 
which it takes place. In turn, taking the latter into 
consideration should enlarge the analysis to a series 
of elements, such as the nature of the goods and 
services affected, the conditions, the functioning, 
as well as the structure of the market(s) that are at 
stake.21 This should apply, in particular, to that type 
of coordination which involves interactions between 
the facets of two-sided systems, regardless of whether 
the restriction takes place on one side only.
At this stage of the debate, it was noted that the 
Court’s view may favor the adoption of a sliding 
scale-approach that is based on the type of conduct 
which is to be analysed, whereby a first small set 
of simple object cases would exist, and a second 
one that requires an in-depth legal or economic 
assessment that calls upon the detection of more 
complex objects, and, finally, a third type that 
requires the examination of effects. Subsequent case 
law has further clarified the different phases of the 
assessment that is required to establish whether a ‘by 
object’ infringement has occurred. In Toshiba, the 
opinion of Advocate General Wathelet pointed out 
that the analysis of the context should not go as far as 
an examination of effects.22 Furthermore, although 
he held that it is essential to fully understand the 
economic function and real significance of a given 
agreement, he also argued that such an assessment 
21.  Para 53 of the Cartes Bancaires Judgment.
22. Case C-373/14P, Toshiba v European Commission (2016), 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:26, para 74.
should apply only to those types of conduct that are 
different to classic restrictions of competition, such 
as cartels, that feature either complex or atypical 
characteristics, or that are not referred to at all in 
Art. 101(1).
The CB judgment has certainly left some room for 
further debate. First, reference was made to the 
role played by the parties’ intention, which can be 
regarded as being embodied in the ‘object’ category 
in the case of hardcore restrictions. Overall, it was 
remarked that, traditionally, it has been considered 
insufficient by itself to prove the existence of a ‘by 
object’ infringement. While Advocate General Wahl’s 
conclusions mirror this consolidated position,23 the 
Court has been much more indulgent in this respect: 
and no direct relevance is attributed to the intent 
although it can be regarded as an additional element 
to be taken into consideration for the purposes of 
the overall assessment. 
A second point raised during this part of the 
discussion dealt with the qualification of the 
‘legitimate objective’. Participants agreed that the 
Court decided not to take a definitive position on 
this point. On the one hand, A.G. Wahl’s opinion 
leans toward regarding this element as being 
irrelevant for the establishment of the infringement. 
On the other hand, some of the CJ’s statements in CB 
made some commentators argue that it is not very 
clear whether the ‘legitimate objective’ may have a 
role under Art. 101(3), whenever it is associated with 
efficiencies, consumer benefits or redeeming virtues. 
While this line of reasoning seems to be at odds with 
the position expressed in Pierre Fabre, in which the 
Court explicitly admitted that restrictions by object 
can be ‘objectively justified’ within Article 101(1), 
it would be compatible with the decision rendered 
in the Irish Beef case24, in which the Court had the 
23. In its opinion (para. 110), Advocate General Wahl stated 
that "any intentions expressed by the participants in a sup-
posed restrictive agreement, decision or concerted prac-
tice, like any legitimate objectives pursued by them, are 
not directly relevant". 
24. Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v Beef Industry 
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opportunity to state that ‘[i]t is only in connection 
with Article 101(3) that [other legitimate interests] 
may, if appropriate, be taken into consideration for 
the purposes of obtaining an exemption from the 
prohibition laid down in Article 101(1)’.
Another strand of the debate dealt with the 
implications that CB had on matters related to 
vertical restraints, focusing on the most recent 
case-law dealing with online selective distribution 
agreements. In Coty,25 the CJ found that the 
prohibition imposed by suppliers of luxury goods on 
their authorized distributors from selling on a third-
party internet platform in a selective distribution 
system, cannot be regarded as caught by Article 
101(1), under certain circumstances. Following the 
conditions that are stated in the Metro26 case, this 
reasoning should apply, provided that the prohibition 
‘has the objective of preserving the luxury image 
of those goods, that it is laid down uniformly and 
not applied in a discriminatory fashion, and that 
it is proportionate in the light of the objective 
pursued’. It was noted that the case originated from a 
preliminary ruling request, submitted by the Higher 
Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, to clarify 
whether online marketplace bans, in the context of 
a selective distribution system, constituted ‘hardcore 
restriction[s] by object’. Although the Court has not 
been specific on this point, its approach analyses 
two different categories separately, showing that 
the ambiguous use of the terms, as they were 
interchangeable, is incorrect, probably following CB, 
and strongly indicating that an online marketplace 
ban is not a restriction by ‘object’ within the meaning 
of Art. 101(1). Furthermore, it explicitly states 
that it does not amount to a hard-core restriction 
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Vertical Block 
Development Society Ltd and Barry Brother (Carrigmore) 
Meats Ltd (2008), ECLI:EU:C:2008:643.
25. Case C-230/16, Coty Germany v Parfümerie Akzente 
(2017), ECLI:EU:C:2017:941.
26. Case 75-84, Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG 
v Commission of the European Communities (1986), 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:399.
Exemption Regulation,27 either when it does not 
limit passive sales or the customers to whom the 
distributor can sell the product. Certainly, the ruling 
is quite different from that in Pierre Fabre, which was 
confined to the specific circumstances of the case. 
However, participants agreed on the fact that is not 
very clear whether the ruling should apply to non-
luxury goods. 
Finally, it was pointed out that other cases exist 
wherein a very interesting tension between ‘object’ 
and ‘effects’ has been recorded. In a judgment 
dealing with patent settlement agreements in the 
pharmaceutical sector, the UK Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT)28 opined on, and ultimately referred 
to the CJ, the assessment of ‘by object’ restrictions, 
which, in its view, should focus on ‘determining the 
potential effect of the agreement, having regard to its 
nature and its context, rather than on establishing on 
the facts what are, or were, its likely effects’. Although 
the Tribunal had a chance to clarify that the potential 
effect should be realistic and be capable of materially 
harming competition, the main conclusion was that 
the assessment may involve ‘some consideration of 
potential effect in the overall market context’.
During the last part of session II, participants agreed 
that further interesting developments may occur 
in the new digital environment, with the main 
consequence being to make it hard to draw a clear 
distinction between the conceptual categories of 
infringement by ‘object’ and by ‘effect’, not, ultimately, 
because one cannot rely on 'common experience' 
with reference to the empirical effects of the majority 
of agreements in such a new environment.
27. Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 
2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ L 102, 
23.4.2010, p. 1–7).
28. Generics UK Limited Glaxosmithkline PLC v Competition 
and Markets Authority (2018) CAT 4, Case Nos: 1251-
1255/1/12/16.
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III. The Assessment of the Economic and 
Legal Context in Practice
The third session dealt with the most important 
implications of the two judgments. It was noted 
that they both encompass a systematic view that 
refuses a formalistic approach, calling upon a careful 
examination of the ‘impact’ that is attributable to 
potential antitrust infringements. Light was shed on 
the fact that assessing such an impact, regardless of 
whether it is actual or potential, against competition 
variables on a case-by-case basis is not necessary 
for ‘by object’ restrictions. Yet, following AG Wahl’s 
indications in CB, it may be determinant in so far as 
experiencing it in a market can ease the decision about 
whether a given type of coordination falls under the 
scope of the application of Art. 101(1). Furthermore, 
after Intel, this type of approach, including a solid 
reliance on a proper theory of harm, is required in 
order to apply Art. 102 to all types of price-based 
conduct, including exclusivity rebates.
At this stage of the debate, participants submitted 
the idea that the most prominent heritage of the 
two judgments lies in the opportunity to exclude 
the unlawfulness of hardcore restrictions that are 
different to cartels, when their lack of the capability 
to restrict competition is proven. This means that 
NCAs will have to take into serious consideration 
the arguments brought by the parties in an effort 
to rebut the allegation of infringement, showing 
that no adverse impact on competition variables 
was produced. At the same time, it was widely 
acknowledged that this evidence should be case-
specific; furthermore, no abstract argument 
should be allowed. An open issue which is likely to 
generate further interesting discussions in the near 
future refers to the features of the impact itself. As 
competition is a multidimensional dynamic process, 
the ideal economic analysis would not be confined to 
price only but, rather, would consider a good range 
of variables, such as quantity, quality, choice, variety 
and innovation, both in the long and the short run.
As the assessment of the economic and legal 
contexts are crucial to this scenario, economists may 
certainly play an important role. The same applies 
to national courts, where the parties will have to 
bring arguments to support such an impact-based 
approach. In this respect, participants agreed that it 
is becoming increasingly important to train judges 
in order to provide them with the necessary skills 
that are needed to understand and fairly assess the 
parties’ allegations of proof. 
It was then remarked that the adoption of a more 
structured approach in the assessment of the 
economic and legal contexts should increase the 
predictability of the screening, which may be based 
on checklists that are useful for drawing boundaries 
around the ‘by object’ box. The list would not be 
exhaustive, since, in several cases, specific features of 
the market may exclude the risk of harm. Relying on 
a set of economic recipes would certainly make such 
an assessment more rigorous. It was thus recalled 
that this solution seems to be the one animating 
the ongoing debate on merger policy in Europe, 
which started with a proposal for the reform of 
turnover thresholds, because of their lack of direct 
relationship with harm, and continued with the 
most recent literature, which increasingly identifies 
market concentration as an innovation killer, and 
which is based on a purely economic analysis.29 
Participants concluded that the hardest way 
forward must rely on a unifying ‘Cartesian’ theory 
that encompasses both law and economics. In this 
respect, it was remarked that such a view has already 
been endorsed in several discussions at the DG 
Competition level. Indeed, the clarification of some 
of the relevant aspects of the debate may have to be 
left to political forces.
29. G. Federico, G. Langus and T. Valletti, Horizontal mergers 
and product innovation, International Journal of Industri-
al Organisation, Vol. 59, 2018.
8 ■  FCP - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2018/11 ■ July 2018
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies 
and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major 
research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda 
is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the 
expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
The Florence Competition Programme
The Florence Competition Programme (FCP) in Law & Economics is a project of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies at the European University Institute, which focuses on competition law and economics. FCP acts as a hub where 
European and international competition enforcers and other stakeholders can exchange ideas, share best-practices, debate 
emerging policy issues and enhance their networks. In addition, since 2011, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
organises a training for national judges in competition law and economics co-financed by DG Competition of the European 
Commission - ENTraNCE for Judges. 
Florence Competition Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Villa Raimondi, 121/111
Via Boccaccio, I-50133, Florence, Italy 
Contact:













Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and  
not those of the European University Institute.  
© European University Institute, 2018
Content © Pier Luigi Parcu, Marco Botta, Silvia Solidoro,  2018
